Abstract. Propositional logic formulas containing implications can suffer from antecedent failure, in which the formula is true trivially because the pre-condition of the implication is not satisfiable. In other words, the post-condition of the implication does not affect the truth value of the formula. We call this a vacuous pass, and extend the definition of vacuity to cover other kinds of trivial passes in temporal logic. We define w-ACTL, a subset of CTL and show by construction that for every w-ACTL formula ' there is a formula w('), such that: both ' and w(') are true in some model M iff ' passes vacuously. A useful side-effect of w(') is that if false, any counter-example is also a non-trivial witness of the original formula '.
Introduction
Beatty and Bryant [BB94] have noted that antecedent failure is a problem in any application of formal verification, as it is an inherent problem in the use of logic, rather than of a particular approach (model checking or theorem proving). Antecedent failure means that a formula is trivially true because the pre-condition (antecedent) of the formula is not satisfiable in the model. We call this a vacuous pass, and extend the definition of vacuity to cover other kinds of trivially true formulas. If vacuity is not indicated to the user, the usefulness of formal verification is compromised, since a trivially true formula is not intentionally part of a specification (and therefore indicates a problem in the design or an error in the specification).
Several years of experience in practical formal verification of hardware at IBM [BB+96] have shown us that vacuity is a serious problem in the day-to-day use of formal verification. While it is possible to check vacuity using hand-written auxiliary formulas, the process is time-consuming and error prone, especially for long formulas containing many nested levels of pre-conditions.
In this paper we extend the notion of vacuity to cover many kinds of trivial passes in temporal logic. We then define a subset of ACTL [GL91] formulas, w-ACTL, for which it is possible to construct a single formula, w('), which detects all vacuous passes of '. In addition, w(') has the useful side-effect that if no vacuity is detected, the modelchecker produces a non-trivial witness to the original formula '. We have implemented automatic generation of witness formulas as a feature of RuleBase [BB+96] , the formal verification tool developed at the IBM Haifa Research Laboratory.
Detecting trivial passes of even relatively straightforward formulas is not in itself a trivial task. We use a typical Sugar 1 formula as an example:
Formula 1 states that last data should be asserted with the fourth data after a request. The translation into CTL is:
A trivial pass of Formula 2 would be a pass in a model in which either request never occurs, or a request is never followed by four datas. A hand-written check of a trivial pass of Formula 2, which verifies that it is possible to receive a request followed by four datas, might look like the following:
Our goal was to automate the checking of trivial passes so as to free the user from coding Formula 3 or its equivalent.
A nice side-effect of our method is that the same witness formula w(') which detects trivial passes of the original formula when true, will provide a non-trivial witness (one instance of the truth of the formula) to ' when false. Witnesses are important because a formula may pass as the result of an error in the formula, rather than as a result of the design conforming to the formula that was intended by the user. Thus, examining a witness provides some confidence that the formal specification accurately reflects the intent of the user, one of the weak links in the practical application of formal verification to hardware design.
Note that simply negating the original formula will not provide a non-trivial witness. For instance, consider the CTL formula:
If we negate Formula 4, we get:
Obviously, since Formula 5 is the negation of Formula 4, Formula 5 is false if Formula 4 is true. However, because Formula 5 is an existential formula, there is no trace which can show it is false, and the counter-example mechanisms of [HBK93] and of SMV [McM93, CG+95] will not generate a trace. We would like, however, to see a witness of Formula 4 which contains a sequence of states on which p occurs, followed by q in the next state, followed by r in the next.
Negating the single operand of the AG operator in Formula 4 as follows:
by the RuleBase formal verification tool. In [BB+96] we outlined its basic features.
will also not guarantee an interesting witness. For instance, a valid counter-example to Formula 6 is a path to a state in which p does not occur. Once again, this is a trivial positive example of the truth of the original Formula 4.
Both the ability to detect trivial passes and the ability to generate interesting witnesses are of great importance in the practical application of formal verification to hardware design. Our experience has shown that typically 20% of formulas pass vacuously during the first formal verification runs of a new hardware design, and that vacuous passes always point to a real problem in either the design or its specification or environment. Of the formulas which pass non-vacuously, examination of the witness traces discovers a problem for approximately 10% of the formulas. Of course, once the formula itself has been debugged by examination of a witness, there is no need to examine the witness on later runs. Thus, the model checking stays a fully automated process in the sense that a non-vacuous pass after a formula has been debugged requires no hand check by the user.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we compare our work with related work. In Section 3 we give some background. Section 4 is the heart of the paper, and describes the theory and results. In Section 5 we conclude, and point to future directions for research.
Comparison with Related Work
Previous works, including [BB94] and [PP95] , have noted the problem of trivial passes, and shown how to avoid them using hand-written checks. This work is, we believe, the first attempt to automatically detect trivial passes under symbolic model checking.
In this paper, we use the term interesting witness to mean a computation path showing one non-trivial example of the truth of the formula. In [HBK93] , Hojati, Brayton and Kurshan describe counter-example generation for model checking using CTL and language containment using L-automata [Kur90] . They do not use the term witness, and do not produce a counter-example for a CTL formula containing an existential operator. In [CG+95] , Clarke, Grumberg, McMillan and Zhao describe the counter-example and witness generation algorithm of SMV [McM93] . In their terminology, a witness is a computation path that shows that a formula with an existential path quantifier is true. For true formulas not containing an existential operator, no trace at all is generated.
Thus, neither [HBK93] nor [CG+95] produce witnesses for ACTL formulas. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to address the problem of generating a witness, in the sense of a positive non-trivial example for non-existential formulas, under symbolic model checking. such that i j < k; M; s j j= f M; s i j= E fUg] () for some path (s i ; s i+1 ; :::); 9k i such that M; s k j= g and 8j such that i j < k; M; s j j= f ACTL is a subset of CTL defined by Grumberg and Long in [GL91] , and can be informally described as CTL without the "E" operators, in which the : operator modifies only atomic propositions. ACTL includes an additional operator, "AV", where A[p V q]
: E[: p U : q]. A[p V q] can intuitively be understood as "p releases q", in the sense that q must hold up to and including the time that p holds, at which point q is "released". If p never occurs, then q must hold forever. Thus, the "AV" operator is a weak operator, in contrast to the "AU" operator, which is strong: A[p U q] requires that q eventually occur. Notice that because some of the "A" operators can be defined in terms of the "E" operators, and vice versa, a CTL formula containing the "E" operator may still be an ACTL formula if the "E" operator is negated. The formal description can be found in [GL91] .
Detection of vacuity in w-ACTL formulas
In this section, we describe the detection of vacuity in w-ACTL formulas. First, we define vacuity, w-ACTL and interesting witnesses. Then we define witness formulas to be formulas which detect vacuity and provide interesting witnesses. We then give the main result of this paper, an algorithm for constructing witness formulas for w-ACTL formulas, and prove that it is correct. Finally, we show some examples.
Vacuity
In this section, we will define vacuity, first intuitively and then formally.
Propositional antecedent failure means that a formula trivially passes because some pre-condition is not satisfiable, where a pre-condition is the left-hand-side of an implication. Another way to think of the same thing is to say that the right-hand-side of the implication does not affect the validity of the formula. This gives an intuitive extension of vacuity to any operator: vacuity occurs when one of the operands does not affect the validity of the formula. We first define what we mean by a sub-formula not affecting the truth value of the formula, then define vacuous passes. 
Definition 1 (Does Not Affect

Definition 2 (Vacuous Passes). Formula ' passes vacuously in model M if it passes, and contains a sub-formula such that does not affect the truth value of ' in M.
As an example, consider the following formula:
Some trivial passes of Formula 7 are passes in which either p never occurs, and thus AX(q ! AXr) does not affect the validity of Formula 7, or q never occurs at a next state of p, and thus AXr does not affect the validity of Formula 7. Thus, the idea of vacuity includes a notion of when q should occur, and not just that it should occur. For instance, if M j= EF q, but also M j= AG (p ! AX : q), a pass of Formula 7 is still trivial.
w-ACTL
We now define w-ACTL, a subset of ACTL which, in our experience, is sufficient for expressing most of the formulas used by engineers to specify their designs. In addition, we will show that we can efficiently detect vacuity of w-ACTL formulas using CTL model checking. Informally, w-ACTL formulas are ACTL formulas in which for all binary operators (^, _, AU, AV), at least one of the operands is a propositional formula. Formally, w-ACTL is the set of state formulas described by the following:
Definition 3 (w-ACTL). Note that simple formulas are conjunctions and disjunctions of atomic propositions and their negations. In the sequel, we will usually use ' to designate some w-ACTL formula, to designate a simple w-ACTL formula, and to designate a possibly non-simple w-ACTL formula.
If p is an atomic proposition, then p and
We call our method efficient because it can detect vacuity of many sub-formulas simultaneously. However, our algorithm requires us to choose one operand of every binary operator, for which vacuity will be detected. We call this operand the important operand, and choose it as follows. 
Definition 4 (Important Operand
If ' is a non-simple formula of the form AX , AF or AG , where is either simple or non-simple, then is an important operand.
The following lemma follows directly from Definition 4, because only one operand of every binary operator can be important:
Lemma 5. For every w-ACTL formula ', there is a smallest important sub-formula s ' , such that s ' contains no important sub-formulas, and s ' is a sub-formula of every other important sub-formula of '.
We justify choice of the non-simple operand of _ and^as the important operand as follows. The choice is simply a reflection of how engineers tend to use CTL to code a specification, as well as how they tend to design their hardware. For instance, consider the following specification: AG(request ! AX(req accepted ! AXAX(read busy _ write busy))) (8) 2 Actually, if the _ operator is derived from the use of the ! operator by the user, we consider the right-hand-side of the original formula to be important even if it is simple. Similarly, we consider the second operand of the next event operator [BB+96] to be important if both are simple. Since these are implementation details, we ignore them in the rest of this paper.
which expresses the requirement that if a request is accepted (which happens or not one cycle after it appears), then two cycles later either the read busy signal is asserted, or the write busy signal is asserted. Logically, this is equivalent to the formula: AG(:request _ AX(:req accepted _ AXAX(read busy _ write busy))) (9)
A trivial pass of 8, in which it is detected that M j= AG(:request) would probably detect a problem in the model, because otherwise the signal called request is meaningless.
However, a trivial pass in which it is detected that M j= AG(AX(:req accepted _ AXAX(read busy _ write busy))) is quite often useless to the engineer, as it is highly likely that she has designed her logic intentionally for this to be so, and prevents read busy or write busy from being asserted spuriously by not asserting req accepted if there was not a request the previous cycle.
Thus, for the binary operators, we have chosen the non-simple operand to be the important operand. We now define important vacuous passes as follows:
Definition 6 (Important Vacuous Passes). If formula ' passes in model M, and contains an important sub-formula such that does not affect the truth value of ' in M, we say that the vacuous pass is an important vacuous pass.
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the term "passes vacuously" to refer to important vacuous passes as defined above.
Witnesses for w-ACTL formulas
In the previous section we defined vacuity, the main motivation of this paper. In this section, we define interesting witnesses, which is the second motivation. Informally, an interesting witness is a path showing one instance of the truth of the formula, on which every important sub-formula affects the truth of the formula. In the formal definition of an interesting witness we make use of the fact that every computation path can be viewed as a model.
Definition 7 (Interesting Witness). An interesting witness of a passing formula ' in model M is a computation path C in M such that C j= ' non-vacuously.
In the following, we define a witness formula, and show how to construct one for any given w-ACTL formula. Because our generation of a witness makes use of the counter-example mechanism of SMV [CG+95] , we first define a counter-example as follows.
Definition 8 (Counter-example).
A counter-example of a failing formula ' in model M is a computation path C in M such that C 6 j= '. 
This is because despite the fact that M 6 j= ', C j= ' for any computation path C in model M. Despite this fact, Definition 8 captures the essence of what we mean by a counter-example, in a succinct and intuitive manner, for the vast majority of w-ACTL formulas and models encountered in the day-to-day verification of hardware.
We now define a witness formula, which is the main definition of this paper. A witness formula is a formula which performs a dual function: it both detects vacuity, and, if not vacuous, induces a positive example to the original formula. Formally, 
Definition 9 (Witness Formula
Construction of Witness Formulas
The main result of this paper is now presented. We show construction of a witness formula w(') for any w-ACTL formula ', and then prove that w(') is indeed a witness formula of ', according to Definition 9.
Algorithm 10 (Construction of Witness Formulas).
Note that the witness construction algorithm replaces the smallest important subformula by FALSE.
In order to prove that Algorithm 10 produces a witness formula, the following two lemmas are needed.
Lemma 11. Let ' be an ACTL formula, M be a model and C a computation path in M. If M j= ' then C j= '.
The proof follows directly from [Lon93] .
Lemma 12. For every ACTL formula ', and every , a sub-formula of ' which is not an operand of :: let 0 be any formula, and '0 be the formula obtained by replacing with 0 in '. Then, for any model M, M j= ( 0 ! ) =) M j= ('0 ! '). The proof is by induction on the length of '.
We are now ready to prove the correctness of our algorithm: In order for w(') to be a witness formula we should prove that the two conditions of Definition 9 hold:
